Institutions

From Liberpedia

Institutions are rules and norms that structure political, economic and social interaction. Douglass North distinguishes formal rules, such as laws and property rights, from informal constraints, such as customs and codes of conduct. Their enforcement and the expectations surrounding them affect which exchanges people can undertake and at what cost.[1]

Cooperation and institutional change

Exchange requires resources to measure what is being offered, monitor performance and enforce agreements. Personal relationships, reputations, merchant organisations and legal rules can help address these problems. North also stresses constraints on rulers: a promise to protect property is less reliable when those making it can arbitrarily seize assets.[1]

Institutional change need not improve economic performance. Entrepreneurs may gain from increasing productivity, but may also profit from monopolies or restrictions on entry. North explains persistence through the connections between rules, existing organisations, acquired skills and expectations. An arrangement can become difficult to replace without being the most productive available alternative.[1]

Learning and preference formation

Institutions can also affect whom people meet, which tasks they perform and whose behaviour they learn from. Samuel Bowles distinguishes responding to present incentives from acquiring preferences that help explain behaviour beyond the original setting. His account includes learning, the interpretation of a situation, motivation and cultural transmission.[2]

He argues that different forms of exchange must be distinguished. Brief, anonymous transactions and long employment relationships provide different learning environments. External rewards may undermine an activity's attraction, but supervision and other nonmarket controls can do so as well; opportunities for choice may support motivation. The effects therefore depend on the particular arrangement.[2]

An experiment with late-pickup fines illustrates the problem of interpretation. Lateness increased and remained elevated after the fine was removed. The authors considered both changed expectations about sanctions and a change in perceived obligations; their evidence did not distinguish those explanations.[3]

See also

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Douglass C. North, “Institutions”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(1), 1991, pp. 97–112, especially pp. 97–100 and 108–110. DOI: 10.1257/jep.5.1.97.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Samuel Bowles, “Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions”, Journal of Economic Literature 36(1), 1998, pp. 75–111, especially pp. 77–85, 91 and 102–105.
  3. ↑ Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, “A Fine Is a Price”, Journal of Legal Studies 29, 2000, pp. 1–17, especially pp. 10–17.