Trust
Trust in an exchange involves relying on another person's cooperation while accepting a risk of loss if that person does not cooperate. Cooperation can then benefit both parties even when the first participant cannot enforce repayment.[1]
The investment game
In Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe's experiment, two anonymous participants each received $10. The first could send some of that money to the second. The experimenter tripled the transfer, and the second participant decided how much to return. Participants interacted once, with decisions kept anonymous to other participants and experimenters.[1]
For example, sending $5 creates the following possibilities under these rules:[1]
| Stage | First participant | Second participant |
|---|---|---|
| Initial money | $10 | $10 |
| First sends $5, which is tripled | $5 | $25 |
| Second returns $8 | $13 | $17 |
Both benefit in the final row. If the second returns nothing, however, the first is left with $5.[1]
In the original treatment without information about earlier participants, 30 of 32 first movers sent money. Their mean transfer was $5.16, while the mean amount returned was $4.66. Positive transfers therefore did not guarantee a profitable result for the sender.[1]
Distinguishing motives
Transfers can reflect expected repayment, concern for the recipient or a response to kindness. Cox compared the investment game with two controls: giving without possible repayment, and redistributing money without an intentional first transfer. He found giving in the controls and additional transfers in the investment game. His interpretation depends on assumptions about preferences across games; he also considers whether the games elicit different norms or decision rules.[2]
See also
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe, “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History”, Games and Economic Behavior 10(1), 1995, pp. 122–142; university-hosted published paper, especially pp. 123–131 and Appendix A.
- ↑ James C. Cox, “How to identify trust and reciprocity”, Games and Economic Behavior 46(2), 2004, pp. 260–281; university-hosted published paper, especially sections 2, 4–6 and Appendix A.
