Knowledge problem
The knowledge problem concerns coordinating economic decisions when relevant information is dispersed among people and changes with circumstances. Friedrich Hayek distinguished solving an allocation problem with all the data supplied from explaining how people acquire and use knowledge that nobody possesses in its entirety.[1]
Local knowledge and prices
Hayek distinguishes general scientific knowledge from practical knowledge of particular times and places: an available machine, a temporary stock of goods, a transport opportunity or a worker’s particular skills. Aggregating resources into broad statistical categories can conceal differences that matter for a decision.[1]
In his example, tin becomes scarcer because of a new use or a loss of supply. A higher price encourages users to economise and seek substitutes without requiring each of them to know the original cause. Producers and users adjust through overlapping connections. Hayek describes an economy of knowledge, while acknowledging that adjustment is imperfect.[1]
Competition and discovery
In his 1968 lecture, Hayek argued that competition helps discover which uses, skills and opportunities are valuable. Prices direct attention toward possibilities worth investigating, while attempts to exploit them reveal information that no observer initially holds in full. The relevant goods and production possibilities are themselves part of this discovery problem.[2]
Hayek described discovery as costly and imperfect and proposed comparing it with feasible alternatives. He restricted the predictions of his account to general patterns of order and adjustment; the particular discoveries and distribution of gains remain uncertain. The resulting market order coordinates diverse individual ends, while allowing some expectations to be disappointed.[2]
Private information in experimental markets
In Vernon Smith’s 1962 classroom markets, buyers and sellers received private reservation prices. They could announce bids or offers to the group and accept a proposed trade. Participants did not receive the complete supply and demand schedules known to the experimenter. Prices approached the predicted equilibrium in many sessions, although results varied with market organisation and the schedules used.[3]
The main classroom series used instructions about hypothetical profits. An added footnote reports a paid follow-up with the same flat-supply design, in which prices reached the predicted equilibrium. A sellers-only quotation rule in another test produced weaker convergence.[3]
Most tests renewed the same assigned values over successive trading periods and excluded resale. Smith warned against broad generalisations from the small series.[3]
Calculation and coordination
For illustration, if a buyer values a unit at 10 and a seller’s cost is 6, a price of 8 gives each a gain of 2. Knowing both numbers makes the potential gain easy to calculate. Finding a trading partner, learning the available terms and reaching an agreement are additional problems. An observer’s calculation of a possible outcome and the process that produces it are separate questions.[1][3]
See also
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Friedrich A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, American Economic Review 35(4), September 1945, pp. 519–530, sections I–VII.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Friedrich A. Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Procedure”, translated by Marcellus S. Snow, Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 5(3), Fall 2002, pp. 9–23, especially 9–16; translation of the 1968 Kiel lecture.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 Vernon L. Smith, “An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior”, Journal of Political Economy 70(2), April 1962, pp. 111–137, especially pp. 112–125, note 9 and the summary on p. 134; published paper.
