Club goods

From Liberpedia

Club goods are goods or services whose users can be excluded and whose benefits can be shared with little reduction for other users until congestion develops. A swimming pool with controlled admission is an example. Excludability and congestion concern how a service can be used; they do not identify who owns or finances it.[1]

Sharing costs and capacity

James Buchanan's 1965 theory makes membership a choice alongside the size of the facility. More members can reduce each person's share of its cost, but crowding can reduce the benefit of using it. Membership and capacity therefore have to be considered together.[2]

For example, if a facility costs 120 units, four members sharing equally pay 30 each; twelve members pay 10 each. This arithmetic alone does not determine the best membership. The value of less crowded access and the cost of increasing capacity also enter the decision.

Buchanan's diagrams assume identical members and specified cost shares. With different valuations, payments, capacity and membership must be determined together; more than one efficient arrangement may be possible.[2]

Organisation and agreement

Firms, cooperatives and public bodies can organise sharing arrangements. Buchanan's basic model requires workable exclusion and leaves the costs of reaching agreements outside its formal calculation. He nevertheless identifies the prospect of benefiting without contributing as an obstacle to voluntary agreement.[2]

See also

References

  1. ↑ Elinor Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems”, published Nobel Prize Lecture text, 8 December 2009, pp. 410–413, especially Figure 1.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 James M. Buchanan, “An Economic Theory of Clubs”, Economica 32(125), February 1965, pp. 1–14, especially pp. 4–10 and 12–14; published paper.