Cooperation

From Liberpedia

Cooperation allows participants to obtain benefits through coordinated action. Whether it develops or persists depends on the incentives, information and relationships involved.

Incentives and repeated interaction

The Prisoner's Dilemma illustrates a conflict between individual incentives and mutual benefit. In the following example, each participant obtains more by defecting whatever the other does, although both obtain more from mutual cooperation than from mutual defection. The numbers are payoffs, not necessarily money.[1]

Example: payoffs to the row and column participants, respectively
Column cooperates Column defects
Row cooperates 3, 3 0, 5
Row defects 5, 0 1, 1

Repeated encounters can change the incentives. Axelrod and Hamilton analysed tit for tat: cooperate initially, then copy the partner's previous action. Cooperation can become advantageous when participants recognise partners and future encounters matter sufficiently. Tit for tat won their two computer tournaments against the submitted strategies; they did not establish that one strategy performs best against every possible opponent.[1]

Maintaining cooperation once it is common differs from establishing it among defectors. Their model distinguishes invasion by isolated individuals from cooperation beginning in clusters. Stability and initial viability therefore depend on how participants meet as well as on the payoff structure.[1]

Benefits and motives

Robert Trivers's theory of reciprocal altruism concerns help whose initial cost can be offset by later benefits. In his evolutionary model, costs and benefits concern reproductive fitness. They do not imply that an organism consciously calculates future repayment. He also used cheating to describe failure to reciprocate without requiring conscious deception.[2]

For humans, Trivers proposed that friendship, gratitude, guilt and responses to non-reciprocation could regulate such relationships. He also emphasised learning and developmental flexibility. These were functional hypotheses: he acknowledged that his 1971 paper lacked direct evidence for the extent of reciprocal altruism during human evolution or its present genetic basis. Observing cooperation, or showing that it can benefit participants, does not establish that particular evolutionary account.[2]

Trust and unconditional generosity

Investment-game controls distinguish expecting repayment from giving without that expectation, and returning money in response to kindness from giving under the same distribution of money without an earlier kind act.[3]


Fines and perceived obligations

In a 1998 field experiment at ten private day-care centres in Haifa, Gneezy and Rustichini introduced a fine of ten shekels per child for late pickup at six randomly selected centres. Late pickups became more frequent in the centres with the fine and remained elevated during the four weeks observed after its removal. The other four centres served as controls.[4]

The authors offered both an informational explanation, in which the fine changed expectations about possible sanctions, and a social-norm explanation, in which parents came to treat extra care as a purchasable service. Their data did not distinguish these explanations. The study therefore illustrates how an incentive can change people’s understanding of an interaction as well as its explicit monetary payoff.[4]

See also

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Robert Axelrod and William D. Hamilton, “The Evolution of Cooperation”, Science 211(4489), 27 March 1981, pp. 1390–1396, especially Figure 1 and pp. 1392–1394; author-hosted published paper.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Robert L. Trivers, “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism”, The Quarterly Review of Biology 46(1), March 1971, pp. 35–57, especially pp. 35–39 and 45–54; university-hosted published paper.
  3. ↑ James C. Cox, “How to identify trust and reciprocity”, Games and Economic Behavior 46(2), 2004, pp. 260–281, especially sections 4–5; published paper.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, “A Fine Is a Price”, Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2000), pp. 1–17, especially 3–5 and 10–17. DOI: 10.1086/468061.