Delayed gratification
Delayed gratification is forgoing an available reward in expectation of a larger reward later. In the marshmallow task, a child can take a treat immediately or wait for an experimenter to return with an additional treat.[1] The decision involves both resisting an immediate temptation and expectations about whether waiting will pay.[2]
Reliability of the promise
Kidd, Palmeri and Aslin randomly assigned 28 preschoolers to an experimenter who kept or broke two earlier promises about art materials. Children in the reliable condition subsequently waited about 12 minutes for a second treat, compared with about 3 minutes in the unreliable condition. Nine of 14 children in the reliable condition reached the 15-minute limit, compared with one of 14 in the unreliable condition. The experiment demonstrates an effect of recent experience on waiting in that setting; it does not establish a single underlying mechanism or show that self-control is irrelevant.[2]
Prediction and causation
Watts, Duncan and Quan's 2018 conceptual replication analysed 918 children from ten US study sites, using a task capped at seven minutes. In the principal subgroup, 552 children whose mothers had not completed college, the association between waiting and academic achievement at age 15 fell substantially after adjustment for family background, the home environment and earlier abilities. Adding cognitive and behavioural measures taken at the time of the waiting task reduced it further. Associations with later behavioural problems were small.[1]
The study was observational, and its sample was not nationally representative. Its results do not identify the effect of teaching children to wait. Controlling for concurrent abilities also changes the question being asked: a broader intervention might affect those abilities as well as waiting. The shorter time limit and the many children who reached it constrain comparison with the original Stanford experiments.[1]
Economic interpretation
David Friedman proposes that distrust of deferred promises may help explain some choices between present and future rewards. He treats the evolutionary account as a hypothesis. The pattern of uncertainty is important: a constant probability of default in each period yields exponential discounting, rather than by itself explaining why preferences reverse as a reward approaches.[3]
See also
- Cognitive reflection — reasoning and monetary choices.
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Tyler W. Watts, Greg J. Duncan and Haonan Quan, “Revisiting the Marshmallow Test: A Conceptual Replication Investigating Links Between Early Delay of Gratification and Later Outcomes”, Psychological Science 29(7), 2018, pp. 1159–1177; published main article, especially the methods, Tables 4–5 and discussion.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Celeste Kidd, Holly Palmeri and Richard N. Aslin, “Rational snacking: Young children’s decision-making on the marshmallow task is moderated by beliefs about environmental reliability”, Cognition 126(1), 2013, pp. 109–114; 2012 article-in-press and supplementary information, especially the experiment, Figures 1–2 and supplementary Table A.1.
- ↑ David D. Friedman, “Economics and Evolutionary Psychology”, InDret 2/2001, April 2001, pp. 9–11 and note 20.
