Cognitive reflection
Cognitive reflection involves examining an initially appealing answer and checking it against a problem's constraints. Shane Frederick introduced the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) in 2005. Its numerical problems were designed to invite a tempting incorrect response that further thought could uncover.[1]
Checking an answer
For an arithmetic illustration, suppose a notebook and pencil cost 1.20 units together, and the notebook costs 1 unit more than the pencil. A pencil price of 0.20 would make the notebook cost 1.20 and the total 1.40. The constraints instead give prices of 0.10 and 1.10. Noticing the inconsistency and calculating the solution are distinct parts of the problem.
Choices and interpretation
Frederick combined 35 studies with 3,428 respondents, mostly university students. Higher CRT scores were associated with greater willingness to wait in some short-term monetary choices. Relationships were weaker or absent for several longer-horizon and non-monetary choices. Risk preferences also varied with the gains, losses and payoffs presented.[1] See Delayed gratification.
Frederick argues that some choices deserve scrutiny rather than being accepted as unexplained tastes. He also acknowledges that a correlation between ability and preference does not, by itself, establish the correct choice for a particular person.[1]
Reflection and numerical ability
Aleksandr Sinayev and Ellen Peters separated CRT responses into intuitive errors, other errors and correct answers. In two studies, calculation and numeracy accounted for the predictive contribution of their separately scored reflection measure in the decision tasks examined. The numerical test therefore combines abilities whose contributions need to be distinguished.[2]
Gordon Pennycook and Robert Ross distinguish the ability to calculate from the willingness to engage in analytical thought. Their reanalysis of a different sample found that the reflection component predicted religious and moral judgments after controlling for calculation and numeracy. These outcomes do not have the same right-or-wrong standard as an arithmetic problem.[3]
These comparisons depend on the scoring model and outcomes studied. Sinayev and Peters also identify reliability limits and warn that familiarity with widely circulated questions can make performance partly a matter of memory.[2]
See also
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Shane Frederick, “Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(4), 2005, pp. 25–42, especially pp. 26–28, 30–36 and 38–41; published paper.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Aleksandr Sinayev and Ellen Peters, “Cognitive reflection vs. calculation in decision making”, Frontiers in Psychology 6, article 532, 2015, especially pp. 3–5 and 11–14; published full text.
- ↑ Gordon Pennycook and Robert M. Ross, “Commentary: Cognitive reflection vs. calculation in decision making”, Frontiers in Psychology 7, article 9, 2016, especially pp. 1–3 and Table 1; published full text.
