Illusory truth effect
The illusory truth effect is an increase in a statement's perceived truth after repetition. Familiarity and ease of processing can influence judgment even when repetition supplies no new evidence.[1]
Repetition and knowledge
Fazio and colleagues tested 40 Duke University students who first rated statements for interest and then judged their truth. False claims received higher truth ratings when repeated, including claims contradicted by facts participants correctly identified in a subsequent knowledge check.[1]
| False claims contradicting facts the participant… | New claims | Repeated claims |
|---|---|---|
| Correctly identified in the knowledge check | 2.59 | 2.93 |
| Did not correctly identify | 3.92 | 4.13 |
These are group means on a scale from 1 (definitely false) to 6 (definitely true). Claims contradicting known facts were judged more accurately overall, but repetition still raised their ratings. Higher ratings do not imply that every participant accepted the claim. A second 40-student experiment used binary truth judgments and also found an effect of repetition.[1]
Initial attention to accuracy
Nadia Brashier, Emmaline Drew Eliseev and Elizabeth Marsh compared initial interest ratings with initial truth judgments in four experiments. Evaluating accuracy at first exposure reduced the later effect of repetition for false claims whose correct answers participants knew. Repetition still raised ratings when they lacked the relevant knowledge. One experiment found this selective benefit after two days.[2]
The tasks measured judgments about general-knowledge statements. Asking people to assess accuracy drew on information they already possessed; it did not supply missing facts. The results therefore do not establish lasting protection against all forms of misinformation.[2]
See also
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Lisa K. Fazio, Nadia M. Brashier, B. Keith Payne and Elizabeth J. Marsh, “Knowledge Does Not Protect Against Illusory Truth”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 144(5), 2015, pp. 993–1002; published paper, especially pp. 994–1000 and Figures 1–4.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Nadia M. Brashier, Emmaline Drew Eliseev and Elizabeth J. Marsh, “An initial accuracy focus prevents illusory truth”, Cognition 194, 2020, article 104054; published paper, especially pp. 2–5 and Figures 1–4.
