To a boisterous cow

I am currently reading the book The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics - the authors there, with a large number of simplifications, lay out how power is arranged. In particular, they offer an explanation for why democracies often beat autocracies in wars. It would seem that it should be the other way around. In autocracies, after all, hierarchy, discipline, etc. Should help in the war, no? It turns out not. For the authors, everything revolves around the concept of a "ruling coalition" that benefits. In democracies it includes a large percentage of the population, while in autocracies it is small. But what does this have to do with war? Wars can go so that it becomes necessary to sacrifice resources for the sake of victory. Imagine that a society has 1 million resources and 1 million adults. If this is an ultra democracy where the ruling coalition is equal to the population, then everyone has one unit of resources. If it is an autocracy ruled by 1,000 chosen ones, then there are 1,000 units for each. Now the question is: is it easier to donate, one unit or 1000?

It is clear that in reality everything is much more complicated and resources are distributed unevenly, but the essence is important. Democracy is a lot of small shareholders, autocracy is a small number of large ones. Sacrifice small, first of all, is easier. And, secondly, in autocracies, the resources of a small ruling coalition are spent on maintaining its power. The guard that storms the enemy's trenches is the guard that does not guard the ruler's palace. And with a palace like this, anything can happen. Any member of the ruling clique is interested in spending the available funds on bribing supporters from among other important people, and not at all on uniforms for soldiers. After all, his position depends on his supporters, and soldiers - it is only in democracies that soldiers and their relatives are voters on whom the power of politicians depends. Therefore, democratic politicians have to pack their soldiers in comfortable body armor and settle in cozy bunkers. Whereas in autocracies, good equipment shines only on those who are busy with the most important things - like the very protection of the palace.

In general, autocracies menacingly puff out their cheeks in parades, but when it comes down to it, it turns out that the lower classes do not want to fight (they have no benefits from that war), and the upper ones do not want to sacrifice valuable resources for the sake of victory. Therefore, in an autocracy, for example, they can send five thousand soldiers to live in a chicken coop with ammunition at hand. The generals don't care about these soldiers - they don't vote for the politicians who appoint the generals. When a burning carcass is left of the chicken coop, this can cause outrage. But what organizational conclusions will follow? Need bunkers, camouflage, secure communications? Of course no. A reasonable member of a small coalition (for example, a general) will rather decide that he needs his own media, so that he is praised, and ill-wishers are slandered. And he will be right - it really will cost him less than providing soldiers.

Therefore, autocracy can allow any kind of jambs, but this will not be a signal for it to systemic change. On the contrary, the worse things go, the greater the interest of the members of the small coalition in preserving resources for the purposes of internal struggle and maintaining their power, and not for some kind of "common victory". Only the most naïve little turbo patriots can think that having received the tinsel, the autocracy will suddenly "get together" and "start to fight in earnest." No, it won't start. There will be only well-fed palace guards and grease-slicked propaganda. It's just the way they work - systems with "small coalitions". And well, I must say, arranged. Literally, "God does not give horns to an aggressive cow."

Follow-up to the previous one. If we accept the logic of the authors of the Dictator's Handbook, then a lost war is not at all a verdict on autocracy. Faced with military setbacks, autocracies give up easily. This, of course, is about those cases when a loss does not threaten occupation and loss of power. In such cases, autocracies logically try to throw all their resources into their own survival. But sometimes it happens too late - like, for example, the total mobilization of the Third Reich in 1943 (the Soviet regime realized its struggle for survival as early as 1941). But when it comes to such a defeat, which does not promise the end of the regime, but only promises a rollback to its original positions or some kind of concessions, then the autocracy will easily agree to these conditions. After all, the main thing is to save resources to maintain their own power. And the population can always be told about "gestures of good will" and "strategic regrouping." The population is likely to just exhale. war for him is one continuous cost. Moreover, the collapse of an autocracy is more likely where the government invests in the war so much that it loses the ability to suppress discontent at home (the examples of Russia and Germany in the First World War). But when Saddam Hussein lost the Gulf War, this did not stop him from continuing to rule. The main thing is that at the same time he managed to keep the guard guarding the most important thing (the palace).

But there is another interesting point. The authors divide the ruling coalition into several parts. There are "necessaries" whose support the autocrat needs. But there should be more, let's say, "spare parts". The fact is that members of the ruling coalition are too confident in their authority - this is a threat to the ruler himself. And so that the tail does not suddenly begin to wag the dog, the ruler should maintain in his henchmen the understanding that they can be replaced at any moment. Therefore, those regimes that do not allow the ruling coalition to completely close up and support elements of meritocracy turn out to be more stable. Here you can recall the Russian Empire with its Table of Ranks. Where the old aristocracy is a threat to the throne, the passengers of the social elevator become its support. And what gives the fastest social lift, if not war? When the ruler places "military officers", muddy field commanders and other people from the crucible of war next to him, he thus simply demonstrates to the old members of the ruling coalition that they are easily replaceable, and therefore one should not rebel and plot against the supreme power.

From this we can conclude: if the war does not lead to a quick victory, then it, nevertheless, is beneficial to autocrats when it turns out to be frozen in a sluggish, "neither here nor there" format. On the one hand, a low-level war does not require the ruling coalition to sacrifice resources and therefore does not weaken its ability to maintain order at home. On the other hand, it supplies enough new loyal cadres, the presence of which reduces the threat of a rebellion by the ruling coalition against its supreme ruler.

Mihail Pojarsky 2023-01-04