Nidheg/The Right of the Strongest vs. General Rules
The Right of the Strongest vs. General Rules
Since Trump came to power, it was as if a portal to the past had opened on the Internet, from where various experts began to proclaim: "The era of incorrect general rules is over! In fact, it was hypocrisy! Now is the time for the real right of the strongest!"
At this point, it would be worth thinking. Why? Because all this sounds impressive and provocative - but only if you ignore the history and reasons for the emergence of the general rules themselves.
Sure, might makes right can work. But history shows that societies that have moved away from it and toward common rules have invariably been more successful. Here are the key reasons why:
— Scale. As populations grew and social structures became more complex, direct violence inevitably became less effective.
— The need for cooperation. As society developed, people realized that cooperation (for example, in agriculture, trade, defense) was more beneficial than constant conflict. The right of the strong, on the contrary, kept people in a state of war according to Hobbes.
— Reducing transaction costs. Common rules reduce uncertainty, violence and risk, which promotes economic growth.
— Появление частной собственности. Закрепление прав на имущество требовало отказа от постоянной конфронтации и перехода к правовым механизмам.
A Modern View: Game Theory
This is where game theory comes in. It helps explain this transition by analyzing how people make decisions in situations where their choices affect others. Consider a classic example, the prisoner's dilemma:
— Two people can either cooperate or betray each other.
— If both cooperate, they receive a moderate benefit (e.g. 3 points each).
— If one betrays and the other cooperates, the traitor receives the maximum benefit (5 points) and the collaborator receives nothing (0 points).
— If both betray, they receive a minimal benefit (1 point each).
In a one-shot game, defection (analogous to might makes right) may be a rational choice, since it promises greater gain under certain conditions. However, in real life, people interact repeatedly - these are so-called repeated games. Under such conditions, a strategy of cooperation (following common rules) becomes more profitable because:
— Long-term gain: Constant cooperation brings a stable income (e.g. 3 + 3 + 3 in each round), while defection leads to mutual punishment and losses (1 + 1 + 1).
— Nash equilibrium: is a state in which no one is willing to change their strategy if others are sticking to it. Cooperation can become an equilibrium if people trust each other and expect cooperation in return.
In society, shared rules act as a mechanism that rewards cooperation and punishes defection (e.g. through laws and sanctions). This makes following the rules beneficial to everyone in the long run, which explains the evolution from the rule of might to the rule of law.
Historical example: Roman Empire
The problem with admiring the right of the strong is that it inevitably leads to social regression, plunging society into the chaos of Hobbesian warfare - the struggle of all against all.
And here's an interesting point. Many supporters of the law of the strong love to reflect on the Roman Empire. However, it is the Roman Empire that is a striking example of the transition from the law of the strong to common rules.
In 509 BC, after the overthrow of the last king, Tarquinius Superbus, Rome became a republic. The power of a single ruler gave way to a system of laws and elected officials - consuls and senators. Conflicts between plebeians and patricians were resolved through legal reforms such as the Lex Hortensia (287 BC), which helped create a stable social balance.
Moreover, even those who possessed real power realized the correctness of such a transition. Having given up some of their privileges, they received legitimacy and long-term stability in return.
