Murray N. Rothbard/Revisionism
WWII Revisionism
- Review of The Origins of the Second World War
- see: The Second World War
- Taylor, in retrospect: “At that time no original sources were available: no cabinet minutes or papers, no Chiefs of Staff records, only more or less formal documents from the Foreign Office with very occasional minutes. This extraordinary paucity, as it seems now, makes my book a period piece of limited value.” (Wikipedia: The Origins of the Second World War)
- “However, according to Kathleen Burk’s biography of Taylor, he did not read Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf until after writing the book.” (Wikipedia: The Origins of the Second World War)
- Negative review of Taylor's "The Origins of the Second World War" in Commentary magazine: https://www.commentary.org/articles/g-hudson/the-origins-of-the-second-world-war-by-a-j-p-taylor/
'Whatever may be thought of this objective on moral grounds, it is at any rate quite clearly formulated, and it was an aim which Hitler came near to attaining when his armies reached the Neva and the Volga. To say that it was nothing but a continuation of the foreign policy of previous German governments is quite untrue. There had for a long time been elements in Germany which had nursed such ideas, but they had certainly not been motives of official German policy before 1914; the vast gains of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty had been the outcome of Russia’s wartime collapse in 1917, not of any pre-war scheme for the conquest of Russia. Under the Weimar Republic we cannot assign such projects of territorial expansion to a Rathenau, a Stresemann, or a Bruening. In fact, Hitler complains that his aims for the future of Germany were rejected, not only by liberals and pacifists, who were prepared to submit to the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, but also by the nationalists, whose purposes were confined to recovering for the Reich the frontiers of 1914. What Hitler proposes is a territory on which 250 million Germans can be self-supporting in a hundred years time. He is quite clear that this territory can only be taken from other nations, and declares plainly that “our people will not obtain territory, and therewith the means of existence, as a favor from any other people but will have to win it by the power of a triumphant sword.”'
Grok:
Murray Rothbard’s review of A.J.P. Taylor’s *The Origins of the Second World War* praises Taylor’s work as a groundbreaking revisionist history, challenging the prevailing narrative that Adolf Hitler was uniquely responsible for the war. Rothbard endorses Taylor’s argument that Hitler was not driven by a grand plan for world conquest but rather pursued traditional German foreign policy goals, particularly revising the Treaty of Versailles. Below is a critique of Rothbard’s review, focusing on a historical fact-check of key claims, alongside an evaluation of the arguments presented.
- Historical Fact-Check
1. **Hitler’s Intentions and Lack of a "Master Plan"**
Rothbard supports Taylor’s claim that Hitler had no overarching plan for world conquest and was primarily focused on revising Versailles, with no designs against Britain, France, or the United States. - **Fact-Check**: This interpretation is contentious. While Hitler’s immediate goals in the 1930s focused on reversing Versailles—reoccupying the Rhineland (1936), achieving Anschluss with Austria (1938), and annexing the Sudetenland (1938)—his broader ambitions are evident in primary sources. *Mein Kampf* (1925) outlines Lebensraum (living space) in Eastern Europe, particularly targeting Soviet territory, as a core objective. The Hossbach Memorandum (1937), though debated for its authenticity, records Hitler discussing aggressive expansion by 1943–45, including potential conflict with Western powers. Taylor and Rothbard downplay these, but dismissing them entirely ignores evidence of long-term aggressive intent, even if not a rigid "timetable." - **Critique**: The claim that Hitler had no westward ambitions is partially accurate for the early 1930s but less so by 1939–40, when plans for invading France and dominating Europe emerged. Rothbard’s assertion that Hitler admired the British Empire is supported by Hitler’s offers of alliance (e.g., in 1935–36 naval talks), but this was conditional on British acquiescence to German hegemony in Europe, which Britain rejected.
2. **Versailles as the Root Cause**
Rothbard agrees with Taylor that the Treaty of Versailles was a fundamentally flawed settlement, creating unstable conditions that fueled German resentment and made revision inevitable. - **Fact-Check**: The Treaty of Versailles (1919) imposed harsh terms on Germany: territorial losses (e.g., Alsace-Lorraine to France, the Polish Corridor), military restrictions (100,000-man army, no air force), reparations (£6.6 billion), and the "war guilt" clause. These terms were widely resented in Germany, contributing to economic instability (e.g., 1923 hyperinflation) and nationalist fervor, which Hitler exploited. The treaty’s creation of Czechoslovakia and Poland, with significant German minorities, indeed sowed seeds for conflict (e.g., 3.5 million Sudeten Germans under Czech rule). However, Rothbard and Taylor overstate the inevitability of war by framing Versailles as the sole driver, ignoring other factors like Hitler’s ideology and domestic radicalization. - **Critique**: While Versailles was a catalyst, Rothbard’s narrative sidesteps how Nazi ideology amplified grievances beyond rational revisionism. For example, the treaty’s terms were loosened by the 1920s (e.g., Locarno Treaties, 1925; Dawes Plan, 1924), yet Hitler pursued expansion far beyond restoring pre-1914 borders.
3. **Anschluss and Austrian "Irrational Toughness"**
Rothbard endorses Taylor’s view that Austria’s Chancellor Schuschnigg provoked the 1938 Anschluss by reneging on agreements and announcing a plebiscite, forcing Hitler to act militarily when he preferred a gradual approach. - **Fact-Check**: The 1936 Austro-German Agreement did recognize Austria as a "German state" and allowed Nazi participation in government, but Schuschnigg faced domestic pressure from Austrian Nazis, who were emboldened by Hitler’s rhetoric. Schuschnigg’s plebiscite (March 1938) was a desperate bid to affirm Austrian independence, as Nazi agitation threatened his regime. Hitler’s response—demanding Seyss-Inquart’s appointment and issuing an ultimatum—was coercive, not reactive. German troops entered Austria on March 12, 1938, facing no resistance, and the Anschluss was formalized after a rigged plebiscite (99.7% approval). The claim that Hitler acted reluctantly is undermined by his long-standing goal of unifying German-speaking peoples, as stated in *Mein Kampf*. - **Critique**: Rothbard’s portrayal of Schuschnigg as irrationally tough oversimplifies Austria’s precarious position. Facing Nazi subversion, Schuschnigg had limited options. Blaming him for provoking Hitler shifts responsibility from Germany’s aggressive diplomacy.
4. **Czechoslovakia and Munich**
Rothbard lauds Taylor’s depiction of Munich (1938) as a triumph of justice, arguing Czechoslovakia was an unviable Versailles creation and that Britain and France delayed appeasement too long. - **Fact-Check**: Czechoslovakia, formed in 1918, included 3.5 million Sudeten Germans, who faced discrimination but also had political representation (e.g., Sudeten German Party). The Munich Agreement (September 29, 1938) ceded the Sudetenland to Germany after Hitler’s threats of war, with Britain and France pressuring Czech President Beneš to comply. Rothbard’s claim that Beneš provoked the crisis to gain Western support is speculative; Beneš sought French and Soviet backing under existing treaties but was abandoned. Post-Munich, Germany occupied the rest of Bohemia and Moravia (March 1939), contradicting claims of limited aims. Czechoslovakia’s dissolution was hastened by Slovak and Hungarian separatism, but Germany’s role was decisive. - **Critique**: Calling Munich a triumph ignores its destabilizing effect, emboldening Hitler and weakening the Versailles system further. Rothbard’s dismissal of Czechoslovakia’s legitimacy downplays its relative stability (e.g., democratic elections until 1938) compared to other interwar states.
5. **Poland and the Outbreak of War**
Rothbard supports Taylor’s argument that Poland’s refusal to negotiate over Danzig and the Polish Corridor, backed by Britain’s guarantee, precipitated war, with Hitler initially seeking only minor concessions. - **Fact-Check**: Danzig, a free city under League of Nations control, was 95% German, and the Polish Corridor separated East Prussia from Germany, fueling resentment. Hitler demanded Danzig’s return and a corridor through the Corridor in 1938–39, but Poland, under Colonel Beck, rejected talks, fearing German domination. Britain’s guarantee (March 31, 1939) aimed to deter Hitler but failed to secure Soviet cooperation. The Hitler-Stalin Pact (August 23, 1939) neutralized Soviet opposition, enabling Germany’s invasion on September 1, 1939. Rothbard’s claim that Hitler had no intent to conquer Poland is dubious; the invasion involved 1.5 million troops, and subsequent atrocities (e.g., Einsatzgruppen massacres) suggest broader aims. The Pact’s secret protocol, dividing Eastern Europe, contradicts the idea of a purely defensive agreement. - **Critique**: Blaming Poland and Britain ignores Hitler’s escalation. Poland’s refusal to negotiate was rooted in distrust, given Germany’s violations (e.g., Munich’s aftermath). Rothbard’s portrayal of Britain’s guarantee as warmongering overlooks its defensive intent, though its impracticality is undeniable without Soviet support.
6. **Hitler-Stalin Pact**
Rothbard calls the Pact a statesmanlike act for peace, arguing it reflected rational German-Russian interests and was misjudged by Western propaganda. - **Fact-Check**: The Pact (August 23, 1939) included a public non-aggression agreement and a secret protocol dividing Poland and the Baltic states into German and Soviet spheres. It enabled Germany’s invasion of Poland and the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland (September 17, 1939), as well as the Baltic states (1940). While Taylor and Rothbard frame it as a defensive move, the protocol’s territorial carve-up indicates mutual expansionist intent. Soviet fears of Western betrayal were valid (e.g., Munich excluded the USSR), but the Pact facilitated aggression, not peace. - **Critique**: Rothbard’s defense of the Pact as a peace-preserving act ignores its role in unleashing war. The secret protocol, known since 1945, undermines claims of mere neutrality.
- Broader Critique
- **Selective Evidence**: Rothbard’s review relies heavily on Taylor’s narrative, which emphasizes diplomatic missteps and downplays ideological drivers like Nazi racial and expansionist doctrines. By focusing on Versailles’s flaws, Rothbard neglects how Hitler’s actions—e.g., rearmament (1935, 600,000 troops by 1939), withdrawal from the League of Nations (1933)—escalated tensions beyond treaty revision. - **Moral Framing**: Rothbard’s sympathy for German grievances risks whitewashing Nazi policies mutliple times in his critique. While Versailles was punitive, equating Hitler’s foreign policy with rational statecraft ignores the regime’s domestic terror (e.g., 1933 concentration camps) and genocidal aims, evident by 1939 (e.g., anti-Jewish laws). - **British Policy**: Rothbard’s claim that Britain’s shift to a hard line in 1939 was deliberate warmongering is speculative. Britain’s guarantee to Poland followed Germany’s occupation of Prague (March 1939), signaling Hitler’s unreliability. Chamberlain’s hesitation to ally with the Soviets reflects ideological distrust, not a plot for war. - **Revisionism’s Limits**: Rothbard celebrates Taylor’s revisionism but overlooks its provocative tone, which alienated historians by appearing to excuse Hitler. Taylor’s focus on diplomatic blunders provides valuable insight but underestimates strategic calculations, like Hitler’s gamble that Britain and France would not fight (proven wrong by their declarations of war on September 3, 1939).
- Conclusion
Rothbard’s review captures the provocative strength of Taylor’s work in challenging orthodox narratives about World War II’s origins, particularly the overemphasis on Hitler’s sole guilt. However, it overcorrects by minimizing Hitler’s aggressive ambitions, relying on selective evidence, and shifting blame to Britain, Poland, and smaller states. Historical facts—Hitler’s writings, the Hossbach Memorandum, the Hitler-Stalin Pact’s secret protocol—indicate broader aims than mere Versailles revision. While Versailles created fertile ground for conflict, Rothbard’s narrative underplays Nazi ideology and overstates the rationality of German policy. Taylor’s work remains a valuable counterpoint, but Rothbard’s uncritical endorsement weakens its credibility by ignoring inconvenient truths. A balanced view acknowledges Versailles’s flaws, diplomatic failures, and Hitler’s opportunism without excusing the escalation to war.
