Motivated reasoning

From Liberpedia

Motivated reasoning is reasoning influenced by goals concerning its conclusion. Ziva Kunda distinguishes wanting an accurate answer from wanting a particular answer. Accuracy goals can encourage greater effort and more careful processing, but improvement depends on having suitable reasoning strategies available.[1]

Directional goals can affect which memories, explanations and inferential rules people use. In Kunda’s account, people construct plausible justifications from a selective part of their knowledge. They need not recognise this selectivity. Their desired conclusion remains constrained by what they can justify, and unwelcome evidence can persuade them. Detailed scrutiny therefore need not eliminate bias.[1]

A self-serving conclusion alone does not establish its motivational cause: prior beliefs and expectations can also explain it. Comparing how people with different goals assess the same evidence helps distinguish these possibilities.[1]

Survey answers and expressed beliefs

A partisan answer can express support for a party as well as a belief about the facts. In two American experiments conducted in 2008 and 2012, Bullock, Gerber, Hill and Huber found that payments for correct answers reduced the average Democratic–Republican response gap by about 55% and 60% on the selected factual questions that initially showed partisan differences. In the second experiment, smaller payments for admitting uncertainty reduced the gap further, to about one-fifth of its unpaid size. That comparison treats “don’t know” answers as non-polarised; reduced disagreement therefore includes people declining to offer a factual answer.[2]

The authors leave open whether payments reduced deliberate partisan expression or encouraged a more even-handed search of memory. The experiment changed the incentives for answering; it did not directly observe every respondent’s prior sincere belief or conscious intention.[2]

See also

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Ziva Kunda, “The Case for Motivated Reasoning”, Psychological Bulletin 108(3), 1990, pp. 480–498, especially pp. 480–483 and 490–495; published paper.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 John G. Bullock, Alan S. Gerber, Seth J. Hill and Gregory A. Huber, “Partisan Bias in Factual Beliefs about Politics”, Quarterly Journal of Political Science 10 (2015), pp. 519–578, especially 527, 550–552 and 559–560. DOI: 10.1561/100.00014074.