Polycentric Defense
I vaguely suspected that the ability for modern "network-centric" warfare was somehow related to the general degree of egalitarianism of the warring society. This seems logical since all the notorious "network-centricity" is about good communication and horizontal interaction of departments. But where will this horizontal interaction come from in war if there was no habit of it in civilian life? I like this idea: it seems that war is the most hierarchical authoritarian affair, at least two, everyone listens to the authorities. But it turns out that even there there is a benefit to egalitarianism.
Now there is a study [1] from George Mason University (consider it such a libertarian think tank) on how Ukraine managed to survive despite the fact that even with all the Western help, the Ukrainian military budget is not competing with the Russian one. By and large, they will get a text about the importance of republican political participation, only written in the language of institutional economics. Let's say they use a concept called co-production. There are benefits that do not require the complicity of the purchaser (you bought the product and use it). But some services, like education, require the active participation of the acquirer. With a service like "security" it can be the same. At the street level, participation can be in the form of vigilant citizens, at the level of an entire country, in the form of volunteers, volunteers, and the like.
In 2014, it so happened that the Ukrainian state turned out to be powerless. Volunteer initiatives were used as compensation. Volunteer battalions, with some of their shortcomings (like squabbles between commanders), had advantages. First, they were formed from locals who knew the situation on the ground better than the central command. There is a well-known argument in favor of a market economy: central planning will never have the fullness of information that local market agents have. Here is something similar. Secondly, there was competition between volunteers (for equipment, recruits, etc.), which allocated resources in the most efficient way. Thirdly, there was a horizontal interaction between all this. After 2014, the Ukrainian state gradually regained control over this freemen, but did not cover it up, but rather incorporated it, as a result of which the established horizontal ties continued to exist, and after February last year, Ukraine showed "polycentric defense" from a superior enemy.
Of course, these factors should not be overestimated either. Otherwise, it turns out ridiculous: the generals at the headquarters planned something for themselves, but the Cossack spirit and the Makhnovist freemen won anyway. But it should not be underestimated either: there is a place for inclusive market mechanisms even on the battlefield. However, we can say that they are even on the side of Russia. Competition between the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, NM DPR / LPR and PMCs, volunteer movement, etc. But the Russian state, unlike the Ukrainian state, is more likely to put pressure on the already small volunteer movement. Why is that? The authors do not pronounce this moment, but I have one assumption. Ukrainian officials and generals may not have wanted to build their society at attention, or maybe they did.More importantly, they couldn't. The state then was too weak to crush grassroots initiatives and, on the contrary, was forced to rely on it in confrontation with external forces. This leads to a paradoxical conclusion: it was the weakness of Ukraine in 2014 that turned out to be the foundation of its current strength.
Mihail Pojarsky 2023-02-10
