Mihail Pojarsky/Politicians and Navalny's article

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Revision as of 00:46, 22 August 2023 by LPReditors (talk | contribs) (Created page with "Surely, many have already read the new article <ref>[https://t.me/navalny/3482 статья Навального про путч 1993] telegram</ref> by Navalny (well, or the article signed by Navalny, if you like - in any case, he expressed all the same theses before). If not, then read on. There about how the current regime grew out of Yeltsin's. That's right: the foundation of Russian authoritarianism was built both during the execution of the Supreme Council and dur...")
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Surely, many have already read the new article [1] by Navalny (well, or the article signed by Navalny, if you like - in any case, he expressed all the same theses before). If not, then read on. There about how the current regime grew out of Yeltsin's. That's right: the foundation of Russian authoritarianism was built both during the execution of the Supreme Council and during the miraculous elections of 1996 (not rigged in the current sense of the word, but including administrative resources to the fullest). However, this may be due to the short format, but the narrative turns out to be simplified. It essentially boils down to the fact that in the 90s, crooks and thieves pretended to be liberals, but in reality they only wanted to line their pockets. For the sake of their own enrichment, they built an autocracy, headed by Putin in the end. And here, in my opinion, everything is more complicated. In the 1990s, the approach "democracy is the power of democrats" really dominated the Russian elites. But was this system built with the same selfish motivation? Of course, there were people with such motivation there. But by no means only they. Many supported for completely different reasons. What is it?

The first motive: the economy is the head of everything. To build a liberal society, a liberal economic basis is needed. Like, Western societies were built on the social base of entrepreneurs and owners. Hence the conclusion: first you need to carry out reforms and create a class of owners, and only then you can let go of the political reins. Until then, you can't let go. This is the conditional ideology of the young reformers, who supported the nascent Yeltsin autocracy for approximately these reasons. And this is not some relic of Soviet Marxism. In the West, too, many thought so, including the smartest. Even Hayek once spoke out in support of Pinochet, not to mention Friedman.

Second motive: if only there was no war. A significant part of the educated population really did not want to go back to the Soviet Union. It's understandable - it was a shitty place. And then all of a sudden you and the red-brown from the Supreme Council, then Zyuganov, who is aiming for the presidency. "Bring it all back" and all that. The reality of the threat was, to put it mildly, exaggerated, but Yeltsin's propaganda of the format of the newspaper "God forbid!"

In general, democracy, as the power of democrats, rested on two pillars - not selfish, quite well-intentioned. The first is the belief that a liberal utopia can be built directively, from top to bottom (no, you can't). The second is the moral panic involved in the idea that at any moment we could fall back into the scoop (no, we couldn’t). But two whales are an unstable design, so as a result a third one was added to them. The search for national greatness, sacred mission and other nonsense. And in the end, we are where we are.

In the context of this, one can imagine what the new 90s might look like. Imagine that, by some miracle, after Putin's death, the liberal opposition comes to power in Russia, and millions of security officials swear allegiance to it. In principle, a miracle is not needed - the right overseas carrot may be enough. All bad people were removed from power, lustrations were carried out. What's next? Further, among the enlightened public, the opinion prevails that under Putin they raised a bad Putin man - all these state employees, contractors and all other state serfs. This Putin man must be released through reforms. And then you can give him power. But before that, no-no-will vote for revanchism and conditional Strelkov. Nevertheless, the conditional Strelkov is gaining enough support and votes. An enlightened public demands to ban, imprison and shoot the parliament from tanks. How good it is when a liberal president has the authority to do so! Otherwise, we could go back to our terrible imperial past again. As they say, God forbid! Another ten, twenty years go by and... oh shit here we go again.

2023-08-18 ...

In continuation of the previous post. I really like that Navalny is broadcasting the message that the liberal government in the 90s is crooks and thieves. More precisely, so: this message must be brought to its logical end. The authorities are ALWAYS crooks and thieves. Anywhere. Without exception.

In economics, there is the old concept of "homo economicus". A sort of rational person who always maximizes his own benefit. In reality, of course, everything is more complicated. Nevertheless, taking this as a conceptual framework, we get very working explanations of many social processes and phenomena. Approximately with the same goals it is worth postulating the existence of "homo politicus". A person who is engaged in politics is a bastard who dreams of abusing power. Reality, of course, is more complicated. But this is a conceptual framework that greatly simplifies life. Sometimes a politician can prove his sincerity - for example, by going to prison for 20 years. But this is rare. Therefore, any politician should be treated as if he had a stigma.

So, rule number one: politics is a casting for the most unprincipled nits. The successful politician is the one who has passed.

Then we can think about how we evaluate politicians. By political views? It's good when a politician is close to you in terms of views, but there is no reason to believe that he will consistently defend them - see rule number 1. Does the politician promise to defend your interests? Thank you, uncle, but politicians have only one interest - their own, for see rule number 1. Is a politician a decent person? Yes, it is important. Politicians have no privacy. He deceives his wife - he will deceive us even more so. But it is worth remembering: a politician who does not deceive his wife is just a politician who has not yet been caught. See rule number 1.

what remains? A simple but most important question: Does a politician contribute to the containment of power, or vice versa? When a alien and a predator fight among themselves, they are not up to hunting people. This is easy to explain using the example of the United States. The local conservative rednecks are unpleasant guys. But they deter opponents who would otherwise introduce "cancellation culture" as a school subject. All sorts of SJW activists are also unpleasant guys. But they stand in the way of those who would introduce the Protestant Sharia. Returning to Russia, you need to apply the same logic. The fact that the Supreme Council in 1993 was defended by solid red-brown fascists is more of a myth. But even if so. Fascists you say? Okay, but what about containment? Were they a stick in the wheel of the system? They were, so it was necessary to take. Zyuganov in the 96th. Bad person. Sovok. But was he a pain in the ass of the rest of the "liberal" government? Was. So it had to be taken. During the 2000s, it was worth supporting the commies, the crazy turbopatriots, the National Bolsheviks and all the others. Not because it was something good, but because it was in opposition to the prevailing discourse of "liberal technocracy". Today, when all this has become a state ideology, it is necessary to support the demshiza, echo-moscows and other foreign agents. But if the latter become the authorities, then, apparently, it will be necessary, overcoming disgust, to vote for the conditional Strelkov.

Mihail Pojarsky 2023-08-20